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COURT INVADES THE STATES'
AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES
I. INTRODUCTION
In Johnson v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that
California's procedure for evaluating a defendant's objections to the
prosecution's peremptory challenges placed too high of a burden for the
defendant to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.'
California's criminal procedure required the defendant to establish a prima
facie case by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory
challenges were impermissibly based on race.2 The defendant appealed and
the California Court of Appeals set aside his conviction, ruling that the trial
judge had applied an overly burdensome standard to the defendant's
objections. The State appealed to the California Supreme Court, and the
court reinstated the defendant's conviction.4
In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court ruled that California's
"more likely than not" standard is incompatible with the prima facie inquiry
mandated by Batson v. Kentucky.5 The majority opinion focused solely on
the first step in the three-step procedure established in Batson.6 The narrow
issue for the Court to decide was whether Batson allowed California to
require the party objecting to a peremptory challenge to show that it is more
likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenge, if unexplained,
was based on an unconstitutional group bias.7 The Court determined that
1 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2419 (2005).
2 id.
3 Id. at 2414-15.
4 id.
5 Id. at 2413, 2419.
6 Id. at 2416 (citing Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985)).
7 id.
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California's standard failed to comply with the procedure for analyzing a
prima facie case set forth in Batson.
8
The Supreme Court incorrectly held that California's standard was
inconsistent with the Batson ruling. The Johnson majority evaluated
whether California's procedure was identical to the Batson procedure, 9
rather than determining whether California's procedure for evaluating
objections to peremptory 'challenges was constitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the Johnson majority erroneously
concluded that California's procedure was impermissible.
The Batson decision did not establish a specific procedure that the
states were constitutionally required to follow. Rather, the Court explicitly
left the decision to the states to determine the best procedure to implement
the holding in Batson, giving the states flexibility in responding to
objections to racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.10 Thus, under
Batson, California had the power to create its own procedure for trial judges
to employ when evaluating a defendant's objection to a peremptory
challenge on the grounds of racial discrimination. The Johnson majority
has changed the Court's position from offering one possible solution to
dictating how states are to proceed. This holding oversteps the Court's
authority and allows the Court to legislate state criminal procedures.
The Court did not have the authority to overrule California's chosen
procedure unless the procedure went beyond the bounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1" The Johnson majority did not consider whether California's
procedure was permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. California's
requirement that a defendant prove his prima facie case by a preponderance
of the evidence did not exceed the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, the Court overstepped its authority to review state criminal
proceedings by demanding that state courts apply the exact procedure
outlined in Batson. The Court reached the incorrect holding in Johnson and
instead should have affirmed the California Supreme Court's ruling.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
During jury selection, attorneys may utilize either challenges for cause
or peremptory challenges to strike members of the venire who may favor
8 id.
9 Id.
10 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
" See infra Part II.E.
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the opposing side. 12 A challenge for cause requires the striking party to
explain a specific reason for removing the potential juror, and the judge
must determine whether the reason provides sufficient cause.' 3 In contrast,
an attorney generally may use a peremptory challenge without giving any
reason at all. 14 Peremptory challenges allow a litigant to remove a potential
juror for reasons that would not be sufficient to uphold a challenge for
cause. 15 The peremptory challenge has existed in American common law
since the colonial courts adopted the English right of a defendant to exercise
peremptory challenges.' 6 Although the peremptory challenge has long been
recognized as "one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused,"'17 peremptory challenges are not guaranteed by the Constitution. 8
Rather, state and federal statutes provide the specific number and form of
peremptory challenges allowed in criminal and civil cases.' 9
B. CALIFORNIA'S PROCEDURE: PEOPLE V WHEELER
In People v. Wheeler,2 0 decided prior to Batson, the California
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant is denied his
right to an impartial jury when the prosecution eliminates all of the African-
American prospective jurors with its peremptory challenges.2' The court
held that the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate prospective jurors
because of a "group bias" violated the defendant's right to jury representing
a cross-section of the community under the California Constitution.22
12 Judith H. Germano, Preserving Peremptories: A Practitioner's Prerogative, 10 ST.
JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431,432 (1995).
13 Edward V. Byrne, The Demise of the Peremptory Challenge, Evisceration of an
Ancient Privilege, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 15, 16 (1994).
14 id.
15 Id. at 17.
16 Judith A. Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of
Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv.
201, 212-13 (1993).
'7 William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges, Challenges for Cause,
and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 49,49 (1999) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
"S Id. at 50.
19 Karen M. Bray, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40
UCLA L. REv. 517, 522-23 (1992).
20 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
2! Id. at 752.
22 Id. at 761-62. The California Supreme Court defined "group bias" as identifiable
groups distinguished on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or similar grounds. Id. at 761.
2006]
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The court recognized that the statute permitting peremptory challenges
does not require a party to explain the peremptory strike.23 However, the
court also stated that a party would undermine the representative cross-
section requirement of the California Constitution if the peremptory strikes
were based on group bias.24 The court's conclusion required the court to
address the difficult question of remedy in circumstances where a
peremptory challenge might be impermissibly based on a group bias.
Thus, the Wheeler court established a three-step procedure for courts to
evaluate objections to peremptory challenges on the basis of group bias.26
The first step required the party in question to object in a timely
fashion and establish a prima facie case that the prosecutor's peremptory
challenges discriminate.27 The court explained that the objecting party must
meet three requirements to make a prima facie case: 1) the party should
make a complete record of the events taking place at his trial;28 2) the party
must establish that the prosecutor is excluding members of a "cognizable
group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule"; 29 and, 3)
the party must show a "strong likelihood" that the prosecutor is challenging
the jurors because of a group bias.30
The trial judge must determine whether the objecting party has made a
prima facie case.3' If the party meets his burden, the second step of the
process shifts the burden to the challenging party.3  At this point, the
challenging party must prove that the peremptory challenge was not based
on a group bias.33 Though the justification does not have to satisfy a
challenge for cause, the reasons must be relevant to the case, parties, or
23 Id. at 760.
24 Id. at 761-62.
25 Id. at 762.
26 Id. at 764-65.
27 Id. at 764.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. The court's application of the "strong likelihood" standard for the defendant's
prima facie case is the root of the problem addressed by the court in Johnson. The court's
language in laying out the first step of the procedure led to confusion for courts applying the
method. The court required that the defendant make a prima facie case showing a "strong
likelihood" that the peremptory challenge is impermissibly based on a group bias. Id.
However, later in the opinion, the court stated that the trial judge must decide whether the
defendant has raised a "reasonable inference" that the peremptory challenge is based on
group bias. Id. These two different standards created the controversy that arose following
the Wheeler decision, and which the California court tried to remedy in Johnson.
"' Id. at 764-65.
32 Id. at 764.
13 Id. at 765.
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witnesses.34 The final step in the process requires the trial judge to weigh
the evidence by both parties and determine whether the challenging party
has met its burden.35
C. BATSON V. KENTUCKY
In Batson,6 the United States Supreme Court reexamined its holding
in Swain v. Alabama37 regarding the evidentiary burden on a defendant to
challenge the State's use of a peremptory challenge.38 In Swain, the Court
decided that a defendant must show multiple, past occurrences of
discriminatory exclusion of African-Americans from the jury process to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 39 The Batson Court held
that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination during the selection of the petit jury by relying solely on
evidence concerning the peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.4 °
The Court determined that the State's use of peremptory challenges to
remove individual jurors is subject to the Equal Protection Clause, despite
the fact that parties are not usually required to explain the rationale behind a
peremptory challenge. 41  Therefore, the Court found that a prosecutor
violates the Equal Protection Clause if he challenges prospective jurors
solely because of their race.42 The Court then turned to the issue of
determining whether the defendant had met the burden of proving that the
prosecution purposefully discriminated in violation of the Equal Protection
34 Id.
35 See id. If the trial judge determines that the challenging party did not meet its burden,
the judge is required to dismiss the jurors selected up to that point in the trial. Id. Further,
the court must dismiss the venire and select an entirely new venire before continuing with
the jury selection process. Id. California's choice of remedies would be burdensome on the
trial court. The dismissal of a sitting jury, as well as the entire venire, can create
administrative difficulties and waste time. The practical effect of such a remedy is that trial
judges will be reluctant, whether consciously or subconsciously, to grant an objection under
the Wheeler procedure. However, the California Supreme Court considered other remedies
and determined that the rights of the defendant require such a remedy. Id. at 97 n.29.
36 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
37 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
38 Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
'9 Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
40 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
41 Id. at 89.
42 Id. The Court did not address the issue of whether the Constitution also limited the
use of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. Id. at 89 n. 12. However, the Court would
later revisit this issue in Georgia v. McCollum. 505 U.S. 42, 49-55 (1992) (holding that




Clause. 3 The Court concluded that the Swain holding had placed too high
of a burden on the defendant." Under Swain, many lower courts had
required the defendant to establish proof that the prosecutor repeatedly
removed African-Americans over a number of cases before the court would
find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.45 Reasoning that this
interpretation placed a "crippling burden of proof' on the defendant, the
Court rejected the Swain analysis for assessing a prima facie case under the
Equal Protection Clause.46
After finding that the Swain holding was no longer applicable to these
objections, the Court turned to establishing a new procedure for handling
objections to peremptory challenges.47 The majority opinion proceeded to
describe a three-step process for the defendant to challenge a prosecutor's
peremptory challenges that the defendant believes are based on
impermissible racial discrimination. 48 First, the defendant must establish a
prima facie case "by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise
to an inference of discriminatory purpose., 49 The Court stated that, during
this stage, the defendant may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges
permit an attorney to discriminate if he wants. 50 The Court gave deference
to trial judges to decide, under the circumstances of individual cases,
whether the objecting party has made a prima facie case.
51
If the trial judge finds that the defendant has made a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the prosecutor and the prosecutor must explain the
peremptory challenge by offering race-neutral justifications.52 Though the
Court did not elaborate on what constitutes a race-neutral explanation, 53 it
did articulate that the explanation does not need to meet a justification for a
challenge for cause.54 Further, the party making the peremptory challenge
must provide more justification than simply stating that his grounds for the
strike were not based on race.55 Finally, the court must then decide whether
43 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
44 Id. at 92-93.
41 Id. at 92.
46 Id. at 92-93.
47 See id. at 93. In doing so, the Court cited to its disparate treatment cases under Title
VII for guidance in implementing the new procedure. Id. at 94 n. 18.
48 Id. at 96-98.
49 Id. at 94.
50 Id. at 96.
"1 Id. at 97.
52 Id.
" See infra Part VI.A.2.b.




the defendant has proved purposeful racial discrimination.56 The Court
concluded its opinion by explicitly stating that the Batson holding was not
formulating specific procedures for states to apply. 57 Likewise, the opinion
was not meant to instruct states how to implement the holding in Batson.58
D. THE CONSTITUTION AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury under the Sixth
Amendment.5 9 The guarantee of an impartial jury extends to the procedure
used by states to select a jury panel. 60 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Sixth Amendment to require an impartial jury, but not a representative
jury;61 that is, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to a jury that
includes members of the defendant's race.62
The Court has held that the use of a peremptory challenge does not
violate a defendant's right to an impartial jury.63 Rather, the Court has
applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
analyze whether a peremptory challenge is racially discriminatory.64 The
Batson opinion relied on an equal protection argument under the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than a fair cross-section analysis under the Sixth
Amendment.65  By doing so, the Court grounded the review of
56 Id. at 98.
17 Id. at 99.
58 Id. at 99 n.24. The Court went on to explain that states would need to determine the
appropriate remedy if the trial judge found that discrimination had occurred in the use of
peremptory challenges. See id. The Court noted two possible solutions that states may
choose to employ. See id. One possible solution would be for the trial court to discharge the
venire and select an entirely new pool of jurors. Id. (citing Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762,
773 (6th Cir. 1985)). Another alternative would be for the trial court to simply sustain the
objection and not allow the party to strike the juror from the venire. Id. (citing United States
v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 474 (D. Conn. 1976)). In Wheeler, California chose to
employ the first method suggested by the Court. See supra note 35.
59 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
60 Alice Beidenbender, Holland v. Illinois: A Sixth Amendment Attack on the Use of
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 651,651 (1991).
61 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (holding that a defendant did not have a
valid constitutional argument under the Sixth Amendment to challenge the use of
peremptory challenges as discriminatory).
62 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (explaining that the Sixth
Amendment does not require petit juries to reflect the various distinctive groups in the
community).
63 Holland, 493 U.S. at 478. On the contrary, the Sixth Amendment is often cited as a
basis for the use of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Beidenbender, supra note 60, at 653.
64 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985).
65 Id. at 82. In fact, the defendant in Batson raised a Sixth Amendment argument, but did
not raise a Fourteenth Amendment argument. Id. at 84-85 n.4. The Court ignored the Sixth
2006] 1001
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discriminatory peremptory challenges in an equal protection analysis rather
than finding that a racially discriminatory peremptory challenge violates a
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury.66
E. REVIEW OF STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURES BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
The United States Constitution established the Supreme Court to hold
the judicial power,67 while establishing the Congress to legislate federal
laws. 68 Thus, the Supreme Court does not have the power to promulgate
federal law; rather, that is the realm of the Congress. 69  Even further
removed from the Supreme Court is the power to promulgate state criminal
law. The Supreme Court has recognized that the states have the "primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.,
70
Thus, states have the authority to establish their own criminal laws and
procedures. The Supreme Court has the power to review these laws for
constitutionality, but the Court cannot dictate state criminal procedures.7'
The Supreme Court does not have supervisory power over the states'
judicial proceedings.72 The Supreme Court may only evaluate a state's
criminal procedure for any violations of the United States Constitution.73 If
the Court finds that a state's law is unconstitutional, the Court has the
authority to overrule the state.74  However, absent a finding of
unconstitutionality, the Court does not have the power to overturn a state's
laws.
75
Amendment argument and based its conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
66 See Robert W. Rodriguez, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection, the Fair Cross-
Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMORY L.J.
755, 763 (1988).
67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
68 Id. at art. I, § 1.
69 Id.
70 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1992) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 128 (1982)). The Court went on to note that "[i]n criminal trials [the states] also hold
the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state
criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights." Id.
71 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) (stating that the Court's
authority over state courts is limited to enforcing the Constitution); Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (explaining that the federal courts may only intervene in state judicial
proceedings to correct violations of the Constitution).
72 Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221.
73 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438; Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221.
74 SeeDickerson, 530 U.S. at 438; Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221.
75 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438; Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221.
1002 [Vol. 96
JOHNSON v. CALIFORNIA
11. FACTS OF THE CASE
Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was tried in a California trial court
for assault on a white nineteen-month-old child, resulting in death.76
During jury selection, the attorneys for the prosecution and defense used
challenges for cause to reduce the pool of prospective jurors to forty-three.77
At this point, three eligible African-American jurors remained in the pool.
78
The prosecutor used three peremptory challenges to remove the remaining
prospective African-American jurors.79  After the second of these
peremptory challenges, the defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was
unconstitutionally striking jurors on the basis of their race.80
The trial judge did not request an explanation of the prosecution's
rationale for his peremptory strike. 81 Rather, the judge determined that the
defendant had not established a prima facie case for racial discrimination.82
The judge applied the governing state precedent of Wheeler, finding "that
there's not been shown a strong likelihood that the exercise of the
peremptory challenges were based upon a group rather than individual
basis. 83 Nevertheless, at this point, the judge warned the prosecutor that
"we are very close.",84
The following day, the prosecutor struck the only remaining
prospective black juror with a peremptory strike.85 In response, the defense
made another objection on the basis that the prosecutor's challenges
constituted a "systemic attempt to exclude African-Americans from the jury
panel., 86 Again, the trial judge did not ask the prosecutor to explain his
challenges. 87 The judge examined the record for himself and determined
that the prosecutor's strikes could be justified by race-neutral reasons. 88
The judge stated that the African-American members of the venire had
provided equivocal or confusing answers to written questionnaires.89

















According to the judge, the answers on the questionnaires were a sufficient
basis for the strikes even though the court would not have granted
challenges for cause.90 Although the prosecutor had stricken all of the
prospective African-American jurors, the judge ruled that the defendant had
failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.9 The final
selected jurors, including alternates, were all white.92 The defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder.
93
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
The defendant appealed his conviction to the California Court of
Appeal, arguing in part that the trial judge had incorrectly overruled the
defendant's objections to the peremptory challenges by the prosecution.94
The court found that the defendant had established a prima facie case for
discrimination and reversed the trial court's ruling.95  Examining the
relevant federal and state case law, the court found that many California
state courts required the defendant to show a "strong likelihood" pursuant to
Wheeler, while the Ninth Circuit required only a "reasonable inference"
under Batson.96
The appellate court determined that California could not apply a more
stringent evidentiary standard than what the United States Supreme Court
outlined in Batson.97 Therefore, since the Batson procedure only required a
reasonable inference, the California procedure could also require only a
reasonable inference. 98 The court determined that the "strong likelihood"
standard was an unconstitutional standard to apply to an objecting party's
prima facie case against a peremptory challenge.99 Thus, the appellate court
determined that the trial judge improperly required the defendant to show a





94 People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd 71 P.3d 270
(Cal. 2003), rev'd, Johnson v. California, 125. S. Ct. 2410 (2005).
95 Id.




1 o Id. at 741.
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The appellate court ruled that the trial judge should have only required
sufficient evidence to support an "inference" of discrimination. °10 The
majority went on to apply the "reasonable inference" standard, concluding
that the defendant had established a prima facie case of group bias.102
B. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
The State appealed the decision to the California Supreme Court.'
0 3
On appeal, Johnson argued that the "strong likelihood" standard was a
higher standard than was permitted by Batson.104 The California Supreme
Court held that under both Batson and Wheeler, the prima facie case must
show that it is "more likely than not" that the peremptory challenges were
impermissibly based on race, if the challenging party cannot explain the
peremptory challenge with a race-neutral explanation.
0 5
The court addressed whether the "strong likelihood" standard was
inconsistent with the Batson ruling.10 6  The court briefly discussed the
issues raised by the appellate court regarding the confusing case law in
California and federal courts. 10 7  The court stated that the "strong
likelihood" and "reasonable inference" standards were, in fact, the same
standard.10 8 The court rejected the Ninth Circuit and California appellate
court's findings that the "strong likelihood" standard placed a lower level of
scrutiny on the party making the peremptory challenge. 10 9 The California
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2003), rev'd, Johnson v. California, 125. S. Ct.
2410 (2005).
104 Id. at 272. The defendant also challenged the California Supreme Court's prohibition
against "comparative juror" analysis. Id. This argument is not particularly pertinent to this
Note, and will not be addressed.
105 Id. In its review of Batson, the California Supreme Court noted that the Batson
opinion referenced the disparate treatment analysis under Title VII. Id. at 275. Under Title
VII cases, the party alleging racial discrimination maintains the ultimate burden of
persuasion throughout the analysis. Id. (citing Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981)); see infra Part VI.B. Likewise, the burden of persuasion remains
with the objecting party under a Batson procedure. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93
(1986) ("As in any equal protection case, the 'burden is, of course' on the defendant who
alleges discriminatory selection of the venire 'to prove the existence of purposeful
discrimination."') (citations omitted). The court then discussed the portion of Batson that
specifically allowed state courts to establish the standards for evaluating the sufficiency of a
defendant's prima facie case. Johnson, 71 P.3d at 277.
106 Johnson, 71 P.3d at 279.
107 Id. at 280.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 277.
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court determined that the Batson opinion allowed for lower courts to
determine the quantum of proof required for a prima facie case. 110
The California Supreme Court found that the "strong likelihood"
standard, while substantial, was not overly burdensome."' The court
determined that the high standard was important so that a party could not
abuse the peremptory challenge system, but could make a case where racial
discrimination had in fact occurred. 12 The court concluded that the "strong
likelihood" standard requires the objecting party to provide proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.1 3 The court went on to examine the record
and apply this standard to the facts of the case. 114 Although the court found
it suspicious that the prosecutor had stricken all of the African-American
prospective jurors, the majority opinion deferred to the trial judge's
ruling. '
V. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court held, in an eight-to-one
decision authored by Justice Stevens, that California's "more likely than
not" standard is incompatible with the prima facie inquiry mandated by
Batson. 16 The majority opinion focused solely on the first step in the three-
10 Id. According to the majority opinion, the standard applied by California was no
more burdensome than the test applied in Batson. Id. at 278. Again, the court turned to Title
VII cases to support its decision. Id. Looking at Title VII cases, the California Supreme
Court determined that the Title VII analysis requires that the adverse employment actions are
more likely than not based on discrimination. Id. (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978)). The court went on to review other decisions using the same
language, as well as decisions using "preponderance of evidence" as the standard. Id. The
California Supreme Court found support by looking to other courts applying the same
analysis to Batson. Id. In Connecticut, the state Supreme Court required a preponderance of
evidence at the first stage of a Batson challenge. Id. at 279 (citing State v. Gonzalez, 538
A.2d 210, 213 (Conn. 1988) (finding that the defendant must establish a prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence under Batson)). The Maryland Court of Appeals reached
the same conclusion. Id. (citing Mejia v. State, 616 A.2d 356, 361 (Md. 1992) (finding that
the objecting party must establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence
under Batson)).
... Id. at 279.
112 Id.
113 Id. The court noted that the law of evidence in California sets the default burden of
proof at a preponderance of the evidence unless otherwise provided by law. Id. (citing CAL.
EvID. CODE, § 115 (West 2006)).
"' Id. at 287.
115 Id.
116 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2419 (2005).
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step procedure established in Batson." 7 The narrow issue for the Court to
decide was whether Batson allowed California to require the objecting party
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory challenge,
if unexplained, was based on an unconstitutional group bias." 8 The Court
recognized that the states had flexibility to develop proper procedures that
would comply with Batson.119 However, the Court determined that
California's standard failed to comply with the procedure for analyzing a
prima facie case as set forth in Batson.
120
The Court found no support in the Batson opinion for California's
standard. 21 Specifically, the Court noted that Batson allowed the defendant
to offer a variety of evidence, which needed only to give "rise to an
inference of discriminatory purpose."'122 The Court went on to clarify the
Batson holding, stating that the first step should not be so burdensome that
a defendant would have to demonstrate that the prosecutor's challenge was
more likely than not based on purposeful discrimination.1 23 Rather, the
Batson decision required only sufficient evidence to allow the trial judge to
draw an inference that the prosecutor discriminated in his peremptory
challenges. 124
The Court rejected California's argument that a standard requiring the
defendant to prove the ultimate facts by a preponderance of evidence is
proper under the Batson test.125 The Court explained that California's test
placed the burden on the defendant at the wrong stage. 126 The defendant
carries the "burden of persuasion" under the Batson analysis, but it is not
until the third step of the analysis that the persuasiveness of the evidence is
at issue.127 At step two, the prosecution may offer any justification, even if
it is "frivolous or utterly nonsensical."'' 28 Once this justification has been
offered, the inquiry proceeds to step three. 129 Thus, the first two steps are
the production steps, while the third step is where persuasiveness is
117 Id. at 2416.
118 Id. at 2413.
'9 Id. at 2416.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986)).
123 Id. at 2417.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2418.
127 Id. at 2417-18.




evaluated.130 The Court held that California's standard was too onerous for
the defendant to meet at the first stage.'
31
Based on the comments of the trial judge and the California Supreme
Court's opinion, the majority determined that the defendant raised an
inference of discrimination and, therefore, established a prima facie case for
discrimination. 132  The Court reversed the decision of the California
Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
133
B. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Thomas wrote the lone dissenting opinion. 134 Thomas argued
that Batson granted the states flexibility in developing appropriate
procedures that would comply with the Court's holding in Batson.
135
Despite this promised flexibility, the Johnson Court told California exactly
how to comply with the prima facie inquiry established by Batson.
136
Thomas described the Batson approach as a "prophylactic framework" that
would police impermissible race discrimination in jury selection.
37
Since the Batson ruling did not establish an independent constitutional
command, the states should have wide discretion to develop a workable
process. 138 Thomas argued that the states have the flexibility to develop
their own procedure so long as it met the minimum requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 139 In his opinion, California crafted a procedure
that fell within its broad discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment and
should have been permitted by the Court to develop its own rules of
criminal procedure. 1
40
130 Id. at 2418.
131 Id. Again, the Court referenced the Title VII burden-shifting framework in
understanding the procedure established in Batson. Id. at 2418 n.7. The Court further
justified its holding by examining the purposes of the procedure established in Batson. Id. at
2418. According to the majority, the Batson procedure was intended to answer "suspicions
and inferences" of discrimination in jury selection. Id. The process allows for the trial court
to make a prompt ruling without causing delay or disruption in the jury selection process. Id.
132 Id. at 2419.
133 Id.
134 Justice Breyer filed a one-sentence concurrence. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). In that
concurrence, he maintained the position he had explained in his concurring opinion in
Miller-El v. Dretke. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317
(2005) (arguing for the Court to abolish the peremptory challenge system as a whole)).
135 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).




The Johnson majority, instead of determining whether California's
procedure for evaluating objections to peremptory challenges was
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, evaluated whether
California's procedure was identical to the Batson procedure. In doing so,
the Johnson majority exceeded the constitutional authority of the Supreme
Court and erroneously concluded that California's procedure was
impermissible. Such a conclusion has no basis in the Court's prior rulings,
or in the United States Constitution. Therefore, the Court should have
affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision.
The Batson opinion did not indicate that the three-step procedure was a
constitutional requirement that the states were obligated to follow. Rather,
the Batson majority merely offered one solution for states to employ, while
declining to "formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a
defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges. ' 41 The Court
thus provided the states flexibility in responding to objections to racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges.1 42  Therefore, California had the
power to create its own procedure for trial judges to employ when
evaluating a defendant's objection to a peremptory challenge on the
grounds of racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court only had the authority to overrule California's
chosen procedure if the procedure violated the Constitution. 43 However,
the Johnson majority never determined whether California's procedure
went so far as to breach the constitutional rights of the defendant. The
Batson ruling, along with subsequent decisions by the Court, clearly
established that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
governs racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. 44 The Johnson
majority did not examine whether California's procedure exceeded the
limits of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court should have found, as
Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, 45 that California did not place such an
onerous burden on defendants so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, the Court overstepped its authority to review state criminal
141 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1985).
142 Id.
143 See supra Part II.E. As Batson was not a constitutional requirement, the Court should
have limited its review of the California procedure to determining whether the procedure
violated the Constitution independent of the Batson ruling. Therefore, the Court's failure to
analyze whether California's procedure violated the Constitution led to an incorrect ruling
that the procedure was impermissible.
144 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
145 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2419 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10092006]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
proceedings by demanding that state courts apply the exact procedure
outlined in Batson.
As a result of its opinion in Johnson, the Court has stripped the states
of their ability to experiment with solutions to racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment. 146  One of the
principle goals of federalism is to allow states the flexibility to address
issues in public policy with a variety of solutions. 147  Yet, the Johnson
majority has dictated a single, inflexible solution that all states are required
to follow. Further, the majority's decision establishes a precedent that
allows the Court to promulgate state criminal procedure, a clear violation of
the Court's authority under the Constitution. The Court has opened the
door to allowing future justices to draft criminal procedures and instruct the
states exactly how to employ those procedures.
A. THE COURT INCORRECTLY COMPARED CALIFORNIA'S PROCEDURE
TO THE BA TSON PROCEDURE
The Johnson majority transformed the Batson procedure into a
constitutional requirement that states must now use without the slightest
deviation. The Court had established the Batson procedure as a
prophylactic remedy for the states to experiment with implementation,
providing just enough guidance for the states to employ the procedure while
leaving enough room for the states to address difficult policy questions with
different solutions. Although the Court now requires states to use the
procedure described in Batson, the Court did nothing to provide guidance to
the states in areas in which the Batson opinion left the states room to
maneuver.
146 It remains to be seen whether this decision will also limit the states' ability to
experiment in other areas of criminal law.
147 See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (describing the Court's
established practice of allowing states "wide discretion" under the Fourteenth Amendment to
experiment with answers to problems in policy). The Court's holding in Robbins relied on a
long-established principle that the Court provides the states wide discretion to develop
procedures that answer difficult legal problems. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 24
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the states' ability to experiment with solutions
to novel legal problems); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the task of crafting appropriate procedures is
entrusted to the states); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) (stating that the
Constitution does not provide the Court with authority to promulgate state rules of criminal
procedure); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (explaining that states have wide
discretion under the Constitution to choose means of effecting policy). Based on these cases,
the states are not bound by the exact frameworks established in judicial opinions, but may
experiment within the limits of the Constitution.
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Without justification, the Johnson Court transformed the Batson
procedure from a prophylactic remedy into a constitutional rule. The terms
"constitutional rule" and "prophylactic rule" can be confusing terms when
interpreting Supreme Court cases. An oversimplified explanation is that a
violation of a constitutional rule is a violation of the Constitution, while a
violation of a prophylactic rule may not necessarily be a violation of the
Constitution.148  However, a more important distinction to this Note is
whether a state is bound to follow prophylactic rules established by the
Court. Although the final answer is still unclear, the Court has provided
some indication that states are not bound to follow prophylactic rules
precisely as the Court writes them.149 Thus, if the procedure described in
Batson is not a constitutional requirement, 50 then the Court was only
offering a prophylactic solution that states were not required to follow.
Neither Batson nor the Constitution offers any support to the Court's
conclusion that the Batson procedure is a constitutional requirement. The
Batson opinion did not itself attempt to label the procedure as a
148 See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article IllLegitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100, 105 (1985).
149 See generally Robbins, 528 U.S. at 273. The Court established a procedure for
protecting an indigent defendant's right to appellate counsel in cases where the appeal is not
frivolous in the case of Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). In Robbins, the
Court had to determine whether California's procedure, which was different from the one
established in Anders, was permissible under the Constitution. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 265.
The Court had previously noted that the Anders procedure was only a prophylactic one,
rather than one establishing a constitutional command. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555 (1987). The Court held that states may adopt different procedures from the
prophylactic procedure offered by the Court if those procedures sufficiently protect the right
that the Court offered the prophylactic procedure to protect. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 265.
Further, the Court never suggested that the Constitution required that states use the Anders
procedure or that it was the only procedure that would protect the defendant's right to
counsel. Id. at 273. The majority in Robbins declined to impose "a single solution on the
States from the top down." Id. at 275. For this reason, the Court reviews state procedures
"one at a time, as they come before [the Court]." Id. (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S.
1, 14 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Therefore, the majority held that the Anders
procedure was only one method of protecting an indigent defendant's right under the
Constitution, and states were permitted by the Constitution to develop procedures that were
equally sufficient. Id. at 276.
150 The clearest example of where the Court has established a constitutional rule is in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Though the Miranda opinion did not explicitly
say that a constitutional rule had been developed, the Court later returned to the issue in
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (addressing whether Congress has
constitutional authority to supersede Miranda). In Dickerson, the Court made it clear that
Miranda had established a constitutional rule. Id. at 435. In the present case, the Court
appeared to transform Batson into a constitutional rule through Johnson without explicitly
saying so. However, the language of the two cases does not support such a reading. See
infra Part VI.A. L.a.
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constitutional rule.15" ' Further, the Johnson majority did not support its
conclusion with any reference to the Constitution. Yet, the Johnson
majority treated the Batson procedure as constitutionally mandated by using
it as a yardstick to measure California's procedure. Therefore, the Johnson
majority improperly evaluated California's procedure with regard to
Batson, finding it unconstitutional merely because California applied a
slightly different procedure, rather than analyzing whether California's
procedure violated the Constitution independent of the Batson procedure.
1. Batson Did Not Establish a Constitutional Rule
The Johnson majority incorrectly determined that Batson had
established a constitutional rule, rather than a prophylactic remedy. In
Batson, the Supreme Court did not have the authority to mandate a criminal
procedure for the states to use, 152 nor did the Court ever indicate that it was
doing so. The Batson Court recognized that the Swain v. Alabama holding
had been interpreted by lower courts to place a heavy burden on a defendant
to prove that a peremptory challenge was racially discriminatory. 153 With
that in mind, the Court overruled Swain and offered a prophylactic
framework for courts to use in evaluating objections to peremptory
challenges on the basis of racial discrimination.154  Although the Court
certainly intended for the framework to provide guidance for states to
develop their own procedures, the Court did not hold that a procedure
different from the one articulated in Batson would violate the Constitution.
The Batson opinion itself gives several strong indications that states
were not required to follow the procedure to the letter. First, the language
of the majority opinion assured the states that the new procedure was not a
requirement. 55 Second, the nature of the majority opinion made it clear
that individual courts would not only be able to determine how the
procedure would be applied, the individual courts would have to do so.'
56
By determining the validity of California's procedure in light of the Batson
procedure, the Johnson majority improperly overruled a state's criminal
151 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1030, 1043 (2001) (discussing how the Court created a prophylactic rule in Batson v.
Kentucky to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights).
152 See supra Part II.E.
' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986).
114 Id. at 93-98.
155 Id. at 99 ("We decline [] to formulate particular procedures to be followed . .




procedure without determining whether the procedure violated the
Constitution.
a. The Language in Batson States that the Procedure Was Not Required
The fact that the Batson opinion did not indicate that the holding was
establishing a constitutional rule is perhaps the most telling evidence that
the procedure was not a constitutional command. The Court did note that
the "Constitution prohibits all forms of purposeful racial discrimination in
selection of jurors.' 57  The Court concluded that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the use of peremptory
challenges for racially discriminatory purposes. 58 However, the Court did
not suggest that the Constitution requires the precise procedure laid out in
Batson. Rather, the Batson Court explicitly stated that the opinion was not
formulating "particular procedures to be followed.' ' 5 9 The Batson ruling
created a stir in the legal community between those who felt the Court was
abolishing an important tool in the peremptory challenge and those who felt
the Court did not go far enough) 60 The Court, seeming to understand the
impact of such a radical change, allowed the states to absorb the new
procedure in a way that would not destroy the peremptory challenge
scheme.1
61
The majority in Johnson, likewise, did not interpret the language of the
Batson holding to indicate that the procedure was a constitutional
requirement. Justice Stevens defined the issue in Johnson to be whether
Batson permits California's higher evidentiary standard of "more likely
than not.' 62 The Court did not discuss whether the Constitution permits
California to require a preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the Johnson
majority did not refer to any constitutional grounds supporting the Batson
procedure as a constitutional rule. In his opinion, Justice Stevens makes
few references to the Constitution. The arguments put forth by Justice
Stevens instead rely heavily on the language of Batson, while none of the
arguments are based on the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other section of
... Id. at 88.
158 Id. at 89.
159 Id.
160 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 13; Germano, supra note 12. But see Bray, supra note
19; Morris B. Hoffiman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 809 (1997).
161 The Commonwealth of Kentucky argued that the Court's procedure would pose
administrative difficulties. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. In response, the Court stated that the
majority opinion was not instructing courts how to implement the Batson holding. Id.; see
supra note 58.
162 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005).
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the United States Constitution. One would thus have a difficult time
arguing that the opinion in Johnson was a "constitutional ruling." Despite
the Court's failure to interpret Batson as a constitutional requirement, the
majority went on to evaluate California's procedure as though Batson was a
constitutional requirement. The Johnson Court, therefore, interpreted the
Batson procedure to be a constitutional rule without explicitly stating their
intent, and with no constitutional basis for doing so.
The language of the Batson and Johnson decisions can be contrasted to
Miranda v. Arizona'63 and its progeny of cases. The line of cases beginning
with Miranda and ending with Dickerson v. United States 64 is a clear
example of where the Court has established a constitutional rule. In
Miranda, the Court addressed the admissibility of statements made in police
custody and procedures that would protect an individual's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 165 The Court set out to
establish "concrete constitutional guidelines for . . . courts to follow."
1 66
The Court's ruling in Dickerson established Miranda as a constitutional
rule. The Dickerson Court held that the Miranda decision was applicable to
both state and federal courts.
167
In contrast to the language in Miranda, the Batson opinion gives no
indication that it is establishing a constitutional rule.168 Instead, the Court
explained that the procedure was open to improvement and changes by the
state trial courts. 16 9 Under Batson, a prosecutor may not challenge a juror
solely on the basis of race, but the Court has never held that the use of
peremptory challenge is per se unconstitutional. This analysis is vastly
163 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'64 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (addressing whether Congress has constitutional authority to
supersede Miranda).
165 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
166 Id. at 442. The guidelines provided by the Court were not, in the majority's opinion,
an addition to jurisprudence. Id. Rather, the guidelines were merely an application of
established constitutional principles. Id. Those constitutional privileges include the
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 458. Finding the privilege firmly rooted in
precedent, the Court also found that the privilege was applicable to the states under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 465. Then, the Court went on to establish guidelines for states to employ
when interrogating suspects in criminal proceedings. Id. at 469-73.
167 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. Though the Court noted that its supervisory authority
over federal courts allowed the Court to prescribe binding rules and procedures, the Court
acknowledged that this supervisory power was only available in absence of a congressional
act. Id. at 437. Thus, the Court had to determine whether the Miranda opinion was
exercising the supervisory power or establishing a constitutional rule. Id. The Dickerson
majority concluded that Miranda had established a constitutional rule that Congress could
not supersede through legislation. Id. at 444.
168 See infra Part VI.A. 1.b.
169 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
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different from the approach applied in Miranda where the Court sought to
protect the specific privilege against self-incrimination.
The weak language used by the Johnson opinion, when compared to
the Dickerson language, further supports this conclusion. The Johnson
majority did not explain that Batson established a constitutional rule, nor
did it discuss how the Fourteenth Amendment required states to employ the
Batson procedure. Rather, the Court only discussed the "constitutional
interests" and public policies that Batson sought to protect.' 70 Though these
interests were certainly important, the Batson majority did not claim that
the outlined procedure was the only procedure that could protect those
interests. 171  Thus, unlike in Miranda and Dickerson where the Court
explicated a precise constitutional standard, in Johnson there is no support
for the Court's treatment of the Batson procedure as a constitutional rule.
b. The Batson Majority Opinion Did Not Sufficiently Explain Its Procedure
The Court's goal in Batson was not to establish a finely detailed
procedure and dictate that the states were required to follow it.172  The
Court's lack of detailed explanation in the Batson holding indicates that the
Court did not expect states to follow the procedure precisely. The shift
from Swain to Batson was a significant change in ways for a trial court to
evaluate a defendant's objections to a peremptory challenge on the basis of
racial discrimination. Despite this drastic shift, the Batson majority did not
outline the particular details of each step in the procedure. Instead, the
Court left it to the states to determine the specifics of the procedure.1
73
170 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418. The Court explained that Batson sought to protect the
rights of criminal defendants and potential jurors. Id. While Batson established a procedure
that would help protect these rights, the Johnson Court did not explain how California's
procedure failed to do so as well. The Court did not elaborate on the specific rights that
Batson sought to protect. In no way did the Court establish that requiring a preponderance
of the evidence at the first stage of the Batson procedure would violate a constitutional right
of the defendant.
171 While it is true that Batson sought to solve problems of public policy, see generally
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (discussing the problem of racial discrimination in the selection of
jurors), the policies addressed in Batson are not the only policies at issue. California
developed a procedure that worked within the existing structure of its criminal procedure.
Without a constitutional violation, the Court should not have imposed a specific procedure
for states to use.
172 The purpose of the Batson opinion was to overturn the Swain ruling, which made it
very difficult for defendants to object to the use of racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges. Although the Batson procedure was offered to help reach this goal, the Court did
not expect the states to use this precise procedure.
273 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
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The Court's description of the procedure proposed in Batson left many
remaining questions for courts to answer for themselves. 174 First, the Court
did not fully explain the different ways that a defendant may make his
prima facie case. Though the Court describes what elements constitute a
prima facie case, 175 the opinion did not detail what kind of evidence would
support those elements. 76  Rather, the Court merely stated that the trial
judge "should consider all relevant circumstances."'' 77 Therefore, each state
would need to determine what forms of evidence would be used in
objections to peremptory challenges.178
Second, the Batson opinion does not give any insight into the meaning
of a "race-neutral explanation" required from the prosecution once the
defendant makes his prima facie case. 179  The Court did not clarify in
174 See Bray, supra note 19, at 533-49 (arguing that the Batson standard provided little
guidance to lower courts on how to implement the ruling). Bray specifically noted that
Batson left open the question of "what sort of evidence fulfilled the prima facie case
requirements." Id. at 537-38.
175 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Court required that the defendant show: 1) he is a
member of a cognizable racial group; 2) the prosecutor has used a peremptory challenge to
remove a potential juror of the defendant's race; and 3) the facts and other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the peremptory challenge was motivated by the race of
the defendant. Id. In doing so, the defendant could rely on the fact that peremptory
challenges allow a prosecutor to discriminate if he chooses to do so. Id.
176 The Court did provide examples of what evidence constitutes "other relevant
circumstances." Id. at 97. The opinion discussed examples such as a pattern of strikes
against a race or group, and questions or statements by the prosecutor during voir dire. Id.
However, the Court clearly stated that these were only examples and left it to the trial judges
to determine whether the defendant made a prima facie case based on the relevant
circumstances. Id.
17 Id. at 96.
178 The issue of evidence in support of a prima facie case for a Batson motion becomes a
complicated policy matter for states to solve through trial and error. Evidence that supports
a prima facie case will differ from case to case. Likewise, different forms of evidence will
be given different weight by the states. An objection under Batson will take place in a
setting where the objecting party may not have access to a variety of evidence. Therefore,
the states should have flexibility to determine exactly what constitutes evidence in this type
of motion, and the weight given to that evidence. In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court
examined the different forms of evidence that the defendant may use to make a prima facie
case. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 764 (Cal. 1978). Examples included evidence that
the prosecutor had struck all prospective jurors of the defendant's race. Id. The defendant
may also show evidence that the prosecutor did not ask the stricken jurors any questions, or
if the prosecutor did ask them questions, their answers did not vary from jurors who were not
of the defendant's race and were not stricken from the venire. Id.
179 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Court did comment that the race-neutral explanation
does not have to be sufficient to support a challenge for cause. Id. At the other end of the
scale, the prosecutor must do more than just deny that his peremptory challenge was based
on race. Id. at 98. The Court would later address the requirements of a race-neutral
explanation in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). There, the Court explained that the
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Batson what forms of race-neutral explanations would be sufficient to
overcome the prima facie case. Further, the Court did not answer the
question of whether the responding party must offer any evidence to
support the explanation, and, if so, what level of evidence would rebut the
prima facie case.
Finally, the Court dealt with the third step of the process in a single
sentence without elaborating more than to say that the trial judge's decision
will rest on the credibility of the lawyers. 80 The third step, which is not
really a step at all, is the point where the judge weighs the objecting party's
prima facie case against the responding party's race-neutral explanation.
81
However, the Court did not clearly explain whether the judge should, or can
supplement this decision with a request for more information from the
parties.' 82 This was another area in which the states could make their own
decisions regarding the implementation of the Batson procedure.
In addition to little explanation of each step in the process, and perhaps
most importantly, the Court did not elaborate on the burden of proof placed
on both parties. 83 The Court explained that the Batson procedure mirrors
race-neutral explanation does not have to be persuasive, or even plausible. Id. at 768. The
persuasiveness of the explanation does not become an issue until the third step of the Batson
procedure. Id.; see also Tracy M.Y. Choy, Branding Neutral Explanations Pretextual Under
Batson v. Kentucky: An Examination of the Role of the Trial Judge in Jury Selection, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1997).
"So Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
181 Id. at 98.
182 The issue here is whether the Batson procedure leaves room for the trial courts to
supplement the procedure with an additional step. The reference to Title VII indicates that a
fourth step may be possible. See infra Part VI.B. Without an additional step, it is unclear
whether the third step includes additional arguments by the parties at the discretion of the
trial judge. For example, if the judge is unclear regarding the responding party's race-neutral
explanation, can he ask the party to elaborate? On the other hand, if the race-neutral
explanation raises points not addressed by the objecting party's prima facie case, may the
objecting party respond with additional evidence? If not, may the party make another
motion to challenge the race-neutral explanation proffered by the responding parties? These
questions are outside the scope of the Batson decision and were also not addressed in the
Johnson opinion. Therefore, the states must have some latitude in applying the Batson
procedure. These questions become particularly important when dealing with the burden of
proof carried by each party, which the Court also failed to address. See infra Part VI.B.
183 The most guidance that the states received from the Batson majority regarding the
burden-shifting framework to apply came in the form of a reference to Title VII analysis of
disparate treatment cases. The Court first referenced the burden-shifting approach to
analyzing Title VII cases in Batson. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18. When the Court examined
California's procedure in Johnson, the majority opinion once again referred to the burden-
shifting framework employed by Title VII cases. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410,
2418 n.7 (2005). However, the Court's consistent references to Title VII provide little
guidance to states employing the Batson procedure. See infra Part VI.B. 1.
10172006]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
other equal protection analyses in that the party alleging discrimination
carries the burden to prove purposeful discrimination.184 Yet, the Court did
not elaborate on the evidentiary standard that trial courts should use to
analyze whether the defendant has met his burden of persuasion. The only
evidentiary burden that the Court noted is that the defendant must only raise
an inference to establish a prima facie case.' 85 The Batson opinion did not
define the evidentiary burden that will satisfy the burden of persuasion. ,
8 6
The burden of proof on the parties was specifically at issue in Johnson,
but the majority in Johnson also fails to provide a satisfactory answer.
While the Johnson Court acknowledges that the defendant carries the
burden of persuasion, 87 it stresses that the persuasiveness of the evidence
does not become relevant until the final step of the procedure: the step in
which the judge makes a ruling.' 88 Even with the Court's discussion of the
burden of persuasion in Johnson, the Court once again fails to explicitly
state the defendant's evidentiary burden for proving the facts. Instead, the
Court refers to the burden-shifting framework under Title VII analysis.
189
Despite the guidance lacking in the Batson opinion, the Johnson
majority transformed the Batson procedure into a constitutional requirement
to which states must adhere. Yet, the Johnson opinion does not answer any
of the questions left open for the states to solve through experimentation.
The Court's vague explanations in Johnson, combined with the lack of
explanation of the other steps, forces the states to employ a procedure that
is incomplete and problematic. The Batson Court did not imagine that
states would be forced to employ the three-step procedure exactly as the
Court laid it out. Rather, the Batson opinion recognized that states would
have to iron out the details over time as states adjusted to the new measure.
Therefore, the Court incorrectly held that Batson established a
constitutional command that States had to employ without change.
184 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
185 Id. at 96.
186 The Court does not seem to have dealt much with the third step of the process, the
point at which the trial judge must determine whether the defendant met his burden of
persuasion. A review of the cases subsequent to Batson does not answer the question
regarding the level of burden placed on the defendant. See also Choy, supra note 179.
187 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2417 (2005).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2418 n.7. Unfortunately, the Court did not take this opportunity to clarify or




2. The Court Applied the Wrong Analysis in Johnson
The Johnson majority incorrectly analyzed California's criminal
procedure under Batson. The Court applied the Batson procedure as though
it were a constitutional requirement, and determined whether California
correctly applied the procedure. The Batson majority did not establish the
procedure as a constitutional requirement, but rather created a procedure for
trial courts to evaluate whether a peremptory challenge was purposefully
discriminatory. The Batson opinion neither states nor implies that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the procedure described by the Court1 90
The states had no obligation under the Constitution to apply the exact
procedure that the Court detailed in Batson. In fact, the Batson opinion did
not provide enough guidance for states to do so.
The states have the authority to experiment with the procedure, so long
as the states remain within the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1 91
In other cases involving states' criminal procedures, the Court has analyzed
the procedures on a case-by-case basis.' 92 The Court has a long-standing
principle that states may experiment with different procedures to answer
complicated problems. 93 When the Court reviews these procedures, the
Court does so by determining whether the procedure exceeds the limits
imposed by the Constitution.194  Even if the Court has suggested a
prophylactic remedy in these cases, the Court does not strictly evaluate a
190 The Supreme Court does not have the authority to dictate a state's criminal procedure.
Instead, the Supreme Court may only determine whether a given criminal procedure is valid
under the Constitution. See supra Part II.E. If the Constitution, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, required the exact procedure outlined in Batson, the Court would have the
authority to dictate to states how to employ the procedure as it did in Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). However, because the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the Batson procedure to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, the Court was limited to
reviewing California's procedure for violations of the Constitution.
191 See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272 (2000) (discussing the Court's established
practice of permitting states to experiment with difficult questions of policy within the
limitations of the Constitution). The Batson opinion determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the use of peremptory challenges. Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). The Court should have, at the most, determined whether
California's procedure was permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has generally given states more latitude in experimenting
with criminal procedures. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991) (explaining
that the Court has more authority under its supervisory power than it does over state courts in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment).
192 See, e.g., Robbins, 528 U.S. at 275 (explaining that the Court evaluates state
procedures one at a time, rather than imposing a single solution for all of the states to
employ).
193 See supra note 147.
194 See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 275.
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state's procedure by comparing the procedure to the recommended
prophylactic. 1
95
This being the case, the Court should have, at the most, determined
whether California's procedure was permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the Court could have compared California's
procedure to the general principles of the Batson ruling, the ultimate
conclusion should have turned on the Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
However, the Johnson Court failed to even mention the Fourteenth
Amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, in its analysis of
California's procedure.'
96
Unfortunately, the Johnson majority went further than the Batson
Court intended by requiring California to apply a specific procedure, rather
than reviewing California's criminal procedure under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court stripped the states of their ability to experiment
with different forms of the procedure to apply by insisting that California's
procedure function exactly as the Batson opinion indicated. Rather than
reviewing the procedure to determine whether the proceeding applied by the
California trial court violated the defendant's rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the majority merely determined whether the proceeding
applied in the criminal trial was the same proceeding as described by the
Court in Batson. By doing so, the Court overstepped its authority to review
a state's criminal proceeding. Therefore, the Court reached an incorrect
conclusion in ruling that California's requirement that the defendant make a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence was impermissible
under Batson.
B. CALIFORNIA'S PROCEDURE DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
Justice Stevens incorrectly stated that the issue in Johnson was
whether Batson permits California to require the objector to show that the
peremptory challenge was more likely than not based on an impermissible
group bias. As discussed above, the Court's approach to Johnson
transformed Batson into a constitutional rule that was binding on states.
The real issue in Johnson should have been whether the Fourteenth
Amendment permitted California to require that the defendant make his
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.1 97 This issue requires
195 Id.
196 See supra note 161.
197 The difference between the two is the analysis that the Court would have applied. If
the Court had considered whether the Fourteenth Amendment permitted California's
procedure, the question would have turned on whether requiring a preponderance of the
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a simple analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If the majority had applied this analysis, the Court would
have determined that California's procedure did not exceed the bounds of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the Court should not have
overruled the Supreme Court of California's decision
States have wide latitude under the Fourteenth Amendment to develop
criminal procedures. 198 While the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the
exclusion of a juror for discriminatory reasons, 199 the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit California from requiring the defendant to make a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly used the preponderance of the evidence standard when
analyzing racial discrimination under Title VII.
20°
The Title VII analysis was referenced first in Batson and again in
Johnson.201 Both times, the Court indicated that the burden-shifting
framework employed in the Title VII analysis would provide guidance to
state courts employing the Batson procedure.202 In Batson, the Court noted
that disparate treatment decisions explained how the burden of proof rules
203worked for a prima facie case. The majority opinion did little to
elaborate on the similarities between the new procedure established in
Batson and the procedures established in Title VII disparate treatment
cases. The reference to Title VII cases in Johnson does not shed any new
light on this comparison. Following the Court's explanation that the burden
of persuasion does not become important until the third step of Batson, the
majority opinion noted that the explanation "comports with our
interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in cases arising under Title
VII.''204 The Court has not addressed the defendant's burden of persuasion
sufficiently to indicate that a preponderance of the evidence is inappropriate
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has used a long-established burden-shifting
procedure for evaluating Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases. In St.
evidence violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
198 See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 273 (describing the Court's established practice of allowing
states "wide discretion" under the Fourteenth Amendment to experiment with answers to
problems in policy); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991) (explaining that the
Court has more authority under its supervisory power than it does over state courts in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment).
199 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
200 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
201 Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2418 n.7 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18.
202 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418 n.7; Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18.
203 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18.
204 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418 n.7.
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Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,2 °5 the Court explained how courts should
analyze cases under Title VII. 20 6 Unlike the Batson procedure, which only
requires courts to proceed through three steps, the Title VII procedure
207involves four steps. In a Title VII case, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case showing that the employer discriminated on the basis of
race.20 8 The plaintiff must make his prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence.20 9 If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, this creates
a presumption that the employer discriminated against the employee. 1 °
Once the presumption is created, the court must find that the employer
discriminated in the absence of an explanation.2a ' Therefore, the
presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must
produce a legitimate explanation for the adverse employment actions to
rebut the prima facie case.21 2 However, though the burden of production
shifts to the defendant, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff at all times.
2 1 3
205 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
206 Id. at 506-11.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 506.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. The language used by the Court in addressing the issue in Johnson resembles this
particular portion of the Title VII analysis. The Court describes the defendant's prima facie
case as one that will prove the peremptory challenge was racially discriminatory, if
unexplained. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005).
212 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07.
213 Id. at 507. Under Batson, the objecting party has the initial burden of production and
maintains the burden of persuasion throughout the procedure. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 96 (1986). There are two questions to be answered here. First, what evidentiary
standard is applied at the initial stage for the defendant to shift the burden of production to
the prosecutor? Second, what evidentiary standard applies to the defendant's burden of
persuasion? As to the first question, the Batson procedure indicates that the defendant need
only raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 96. However, for the second
question, the Court never explicitly stated the evidentiary burden on the defendant to meet
his burden of persuasion. In Johnson, the majority merely stated that the persuasiveness
does not become relevant until the third step of the process, the step at which the judge
determines whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. 125 S. Ct. at 2418.
The Batson procedure only requires the defendant to offer evidence at the first stage when he
makes a prima facie case. 476 U.S. at 96. In effect, the defendant must make his entire case
at the first stage without the opportunity to offer more evidence after the prosecutor
responds. As this is the case, the defendant should also be required to carry his entire burden
of persuasion at the first stage. California's procedure requires the defendant to meet his
initial burden of production by a preponderance of the evidence, mirroring the evidentiary
standard of the Title VII analysis. See People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 272 (Cal. 2003),
rev'd, Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005). If the defendant makes his prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation that rebuts the
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Title VII cases analyze racially discriminatory action, just as the
Batson procedure. The Supreme Court's consistent reference to Title VII
cases in Batson and Johnson indicates that California's standard of a
preponderance of the evidence is not overly burdensome, since the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly does not prohibit the preponderance
standard when requiring a party to prove a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. |4 Therefore, California's standard of a preponderance of
the evidence did not exceed the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Batson, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment governs the
use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases.215 The Court determined
that racially discriminatory challenges would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.216 The fact that California's procedure required the defendant to
make his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence is not a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court requires parties to make a prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence in Title VII cases. The Court referenced Title VII cases in
establishing the Batson procedure. Though the Batson majority did not
require the defendant to prove his prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence, the majority also did not state that such an evidentiary burden
would violate the Constitution. Since it does not, California's procedure as
established in People v. Wheeler is well within the bounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Therefore, the Supreme Court should have upheld
California's procedure and affirmed the decision of the California Supreme
Court.
prima facie case. The trial judge could then determine whether the defendant has provided
sufficient evidence to meet his burden of persuasion.
214 Of course, the real issue is whether it makes any constitutional difference that
California's procedure places the burden on the defendant at the first stage, rather than the
third. However, the answer is no different when one examines Title VII cases. The burden
placed on the plaintiff at the initial stage in Title VII cases is preponderance of the evidence.
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit such a burden at the
initial stage of the Batson procedure. One may argue that California's procedure places too
high of a burden for a criminal case. However, California did not require the defendant to
prove his prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt, or even through clear and convincing
evidence. A preponderance of the evidence is not too high of a standard, even in a criminal
case in which the rights of a defendant must be carefully protected.




C. THE JOHNSON MAJORITY ESTABLISHED A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
BY ALLOWING THE COURT TO PROMULGATE STATE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
The holding in Johnson is an instance in which the Supreme Court has
improperly interfered with state criminal procedures, an area that has
traditionally been left to the states to develop. The Johnson opinion, on its
face, may seem to be a rather harmless decision by the Court, especially
given the fact that the majority was an overwhelming eight-to-one. 2 7 The
Court certainly portrayed the case as one dealing with a narrow issue in one
particular set of cases. However, the consequences of the opinion in
Johnson could be much more troublesome in future cases involving state
criminal procedures. While it is true that the Johnson opinion only
substantively discussed the first step of the Batson procedure, the Court's
decision could potentially alter the way that the Court analyzes other state
criminal procedures in the future.
The majority in Johnson went beyond the authority granted to the
Supreme Court by the Constitution. In doing so, the majority established a
dangerous precedent that allows the Supreme Court to promulgate criminal
procedure on the state level. At the most extreme, the Court could begin
developing criminal procedures and dictating how the states employ those
procedures. Such a precedent violates the constitutional authority of the
Supreme Court and invades the states' power to create criminal law.21 8 The
Court has allowed itself to become a super-legislative body above the
states, determining the best procedures to satisfy problems in policy. The
Johnson decision was decided not on constitutional grounds, but to satisfy
an issue of public policy that the elected government of California should
have been able to decide on its own. By giving itself the power to establish
217 The Court has long held that the states may decide the best procedure to employ
following the Court's ruling in Anders v. California. See supra note 148. However, the
Johnson opinion allows for a future Court to revisit the issue and mandate the procedure that
states will use to meet the constitutional requirements of Anders. The fact that the opinion
was supported by an eight-to-one majority only adds to the weight the opinion will carry in
the future. This begs the question of why the Court would establish such a precedent. The
most likely explanation is that the justices examined the particular facts of the case and
decided that the California state courts ruled incorrectly. In order to remedy the error, the
majority looked for a constitutional justification for overruling the California Supreme
Court. In particular, the underlying facts indicate that the prosecutor excused the only three
African-Americans in the jury pool. Striking all jurors of a specific racial group is strong
evidence that the peremptory challenges were based on racial bias. While it is probably true
that the California Supreme Court should have affirmed the appellate court's decision to
overturn the conviction, the United States Supreme Court has created a bad precedent in its
attempt to correct California's mistake.
218 See supra Part II.E.
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what criminal procedure is appropriate for the states to use, the Court has
determined that it is the best judge of the procedures that should be applied
in every state. Clearly, this should be left to the individual states and their
elected legislatures.
The majority did not cite any constitutional authority for overruling
California's criminal procedure in Johnson, nor did the majority overturn
the procedure based on the Constitution.219 Essentially, the Court took a
prophylactic remedy laid out in Batson and converted it into a constitutional
requirement twenty years later. Yet, the Court did not clarify questions that
have been left to the states to answer in those twenty years. 220 The Johnson
opinion did not alter or clarify the three-step procedure, and the states are
apparently required to employ the procedure without differentiation. In
Johnson, the Court struck down California's procedure because it applied a
different burden of proof at the initial stage. The Court did not state that
this burden of proof was itself in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Instead, the Court compared California's procedure to Batson, found that
221
the two were different, and struck down the California procedure.
219 The Johnson opinion goes much further than the Dickerson opinion, in which the
Court established Miranda rights as a constitutional requirement. In Dickerson, the majority
clearly stated its purpose and went on at length to explain why Miranda established a
constitutional requirement on the states and Congress. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 435 (2000). However, the Johnson majority does not explicitly say that Batson is to be
considered a constitutional requirement, nor does the opinion give any reasons why Batson
should be a constitutional rule. If the Court is truly treating Batson as a constitutional
requirement, Congress would also be unable to establish a new criminal procedure for the
federal courts to employ. See id. at 437 (explaining that Congress may not legislatively
supersede decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting and applying the Constitution).
220 See Bray, supra note 19, at 533-49.
221 The Court has effectively said that any state's procedure that is different from Batson
is automatically unconstitutional without review by the Court. In terms of other states'
procedures, the outcome of Johnson will have at least two impacts. First, courts that have
interpreted Batson to permit the requirement of a preponderance of the evidence at the first
step will now have to change the procedure to fit under Johnson. See supra note 110. On
the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, courts that want to expand the procedure to
allow defendants an opportunity to rebut the race-neutral explanation will not be able to do
so. If the Court is treating the Batson procedure as a constitutional rule, it does not appear
that states would be able to add a fourth step (one similar to the third step in Title VII
analysis). Therefore, a defendant would not be able to offer any additional evidence beyond
what was provided at the initial stage of the procedure. No matter what race-neutral
explanation the prosecution applies, the defendant will not have the opportunity to respond,




In Johnson, the Supreme Court incorrectly held that California's
procedure, which required the defendant to make his prima facie case by a
preponderance of the evidence, was inconsistent with the Batson ruling.
California has the authority to develop its own criminal procedures so long
as those procedures do not violate the Constitution. With regard to a state's
criminal procedure, the Supreme Court does not have the constitutional
authority to dictate the kind of procedure a state must employ.
Batson did not establish a constitutional rule that the states were
required to follow without deviation. By evaluating California's procedure
against the Batson procedure, the majority transformed the Batson
procedure into such a rule without explicitly stating its intention to do so.
Prior to the Johnson ruling, states had leeway under the Fourteenth
Amendment to develop a variety of procedures to help solve the problem of
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. By converting Batson into a
constitutional rule, the Court stripped the states of their ability to
experiment with different solutions.
Without a constitutional rule requiring the states to employ a particular
procedure, the Court did not have the authority to overrule California's
chosen procedure unless the procedure went beyond the limits of the
Constitution. In Batson, the Court grounded a defendant's objection to
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Johnson majority should have analyzed California's
procedure to determine whether it was valid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the Johnson majority did not consider whether California's
procedure was permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. If the
majority had done so, the Court should have determined that California did
not place such an onerous burden on defendants to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Court overstepped its authority to review state
criminal proceedings by demanding that state courts apply the exact
procedure outlined in Batson.
While it is hard to say what the exact consequences of this holding will
be, some of them are obvious. The Court has declared that any procedure
used by state or federal courts that is different from the three-step procedure
explained in Batson is now unconstitutional. States may no longer adapt
the Batson procedure to fit with procedures already developed, or to solve
policy issues that the Batson opinion did not consider. Further, the Court
has established a precedent that could allow the Court to develop criminal
procedures and require the states to follow them precisely. The Court has
transformed itself into a legislative body in the realm of criminal procedure.
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For all of these reasons, the Court reached the incorrect holding in the
Johnson case, and the California Supreme Court's decision should have
been affirmed.
Jacob Smith
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